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Abstract: 
After 9/11 and the War on Terror, Turkey has progressively and substantially started to                  
re-evaluate its geopolitical assets through a series of active and multi-faceted regional diplo-
macy and mobilization initiatives. The widening of its sphere of influence and issue-
entanglement has taken serious proportions, which can be explained in the eyes of an ex-
ternal observer from the    acknowledgement of the country’s vital geopolitical position, po-
litical influence and efficiency, and economic potential and dynamics. As a matter of fact, 
this shift has been materialized through a series of events that started from the non-
compliance of the Turkish government to provide its    facility services (i.e. military air-
ports) for the needs of the NATO aircraft troops’ expedition in Iraq in 2003, stepping to the 
advancement of the country’s mediating role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, passing from the 
enhancement of bilateral relations with Russia, and ending up with the wide and extrovert 
skepticism over the acquisition of the EU full membership status. Given these facts,      Tur-
key seems to behave more confidently in the regional chessboard by balancing different        
interests while solidifying its voice and role as a pivotal power. This Policy Brief examines 
the way Turkey has achieved to re-assert its geopolitical role and aims to put a light on 
eventual steps that can set the country as an equal interlocutor along with the US, Russia, 
and the EU, addressing the current global economic crisis and giving possible solutions to 
the major issues involved in its backyard. 
 
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
Page 2 
    After the end of World War Two and the 
establishment of the spheres of influence 
between the United States (US) and the USSR, 
Turkey has chosen to enforce its ties with the 
West and set itself as vital part of the military 
strategic doctrine of NATO, while nourishing 
the pro-European Community (EC) foreign-
policy orientation through the Association 
Agreement of 1963. Serving as a fundamental 
ally of the US, Turkey was considered as a 
critical bulwark against the expansion of the 
Soviet military power into the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East axis, and a major co-
operator in the framework of the EC’s 
Neighboring Policy strategy. These conditions 
remained intact throughout the Cold War era, 
but also during the first decade after the fall of 
communism and the re-setting of the 
geopolitical order led and sustained by the 
hegemonic power of the US.  
 
    It is not but during this last decade that 
Turkey has undergone a major transformation, 
which is mainly signalized by the launching of a 
number of new foreign-policy initiatives that 
have increased the country’s regional influence 
and stature. Amongst the most striking ones we 
include the mediating role assumed in the    
Arab-Israeli Conflict, the enhancement of 
bilateral relations with Russia, and the first, 
strong signs of explicit skepticism upon the 
acquisition of the European Union (EU) full 
membership status.  
 
 
 
 
 
    The departing point of this shift can be 
initially observed in a tough period of crisis    
inside the NATO Alliance, with reference to the 
US accusations against Iraq’s possession of 
nuclear weapons, when Turkey decided to deny 
the provision of its military airports for the 
needs of the NATO aircraft expedition in March 
2003. This decision by the Parliament had 
shocked the Western community and had been 
invested with unexpected support by the Arab 
states. It is believed that since then, Turkey’s 
position in the Muslim world has been altered 
substantially and that its geopolitical role has 
been advanced, with major consequences in the 
regional balance of power. 
 
The “Strategic Depth” Doctrine 
The constructor and inventor of Turkey’s new 
geopolitical doctrine is the well-respected 
academic, former chief foreign-policy advisor of 
Erdoğan and current Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu. Indeed, he stressed out the 
importance of encompassing different political 
elements in designing a new foreign-policy 
agenda, such as the inclusion of soft power, 
conflict resolution and the abandoning of       
zero-sum solutions in bilateral relations. His 
strategic vision saw Turkey as a pivotal player in 
the international chessboard, with specific 
emphasis on the promotion of a                      
multi-dimensional image in adjacent regions 
that are considered to be of paramount 
importance for the country’s strategic role. From 
that perspective, Turkey can no longer be 
identified as a one-region country, but as a multi
-regional one, should it exercise influence in the 
Middle East, Caucasus, Central Asia, the 
Caspian Region, and the Mediterranean Basin.         
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    The concept of strategic depth has been part of 
a large debate in Turkey about the legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire. Ever since the establishment of 
the modern Turkish state by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk in 1923, Kemalists saw the Ottoman 
legacy as a fundamental impediment for 
modernization, as well as a basic destructive 
factor that could disorientate the country’s quest 
for unity away from any multi-cultural approach 
towards Turkey’s wider identity. Nonetheless, 
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) policy 
has achieved to progressively turn the Turkish 
society towards a more nuanced and positive 
approach regarding its Ottoman past, especially 
by putting weight on the Ottoman feature of 
building blocks for a more assertive role in 
regional politics that could be in the benefit of 
the Turkey overall. In other words, the               
re-ignition of the Ottoman legacy can be equally 
seen as the re-integration of the country into a 
region that it has always been -geographically- 
part of. 
 
    Accordingly digested and accepted by a large 
part of the society and the new political elite. 
The Republicans, who traditionally remain a 
considerable political force in Turkey, are The 
broadening and widening of Turkish foreign-
policy doctrine has also been less able to control 
public opinion, as they used to be in the 
previous decades. Therefore, the influence 
media play has been diversified along different 
spheres of interests and elements of deep 
democratization have been surfaced into the 
public debate.  In addition to that, the economic 
dimension of foreign-policy expressed through 
the liberalization of the economy,  and the  
strengthening and increase of quality and 
quantity of trade transactions between Turkey, 
the Middle Eastern states and Russia, have also 
had a major impact in the shift of Turkish public 
opinion towards a more pro-active and         
open-minded approach towards foreign affairs 
issues. 
 
    By the same token, a number of important 
legislative reforms centered on the strengthening 
of civilian control over the military have 
diminished the influence it has traditionally 
exerted in Turkish political life. Furthermore, the 
unveiling and arrest of high-ranking officials 
allegedly involved in paramilitary scandals (e.g. 
Susurluk) and plots (e.g. Ergenekon), that were 
aiming at destabilizing AKP and reverting 
political normality, have additionally 
engendered an unprecedented degree of public 
criticism. All things considered, along with 
enacting a new geostrategic dogma, AKP has 
accomplished an immense transformation of the 
Turkish society by modernizing fundamental 
aspects of democratic public governance scarcely 
seen during the previous decades.  
 
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
 
The “Influence Race” with Israel  
    Turkey’s strategic and geopolitical doctrine 
reflects the effort to overcome phobic syndromes 
of the Cold War and establish cordial relations 
with all its neighbors. The locus of threats and 
challenges that were entrenching USSR as 
primary source of danger were substituted by a 
much more diverse set of security dilemmas that 
have to be addressed, such as the Kurdish 
separatist movement, the sectarian violence in 
Iraq, and the nuclear-armed Iran. Although 
Turkey has been entangled with serious 
initiatives in the previous cases, its mediating 
role in the Arab-Israeli conflict inevitably strikes 
the attention. 
 
    While Turkey is steadily maintaining and 
nourishing strong ties with the Arab world, the 
bilateral relations with Israel have recently      
become strained. Despite being the first Muslim 
state to recognize Israel in 1949 and develop 
strategic-priority co-operation, and high-paced 
trade proceedings and pacts, diplomatic         
dialogue has suffered a sharp deterioration due 
to Turkey’s outspoken condemnation of Israel 
during the winter 2008-09 offensive in Gaza. As 
a matter of fact, in the course of the World      
Economic Forum in January 2009, Prime        
Minister Erdoğan and the Israeli President Peres 
entered a verbal confrontation when the former 
was not allowed to finish his criticisms of the 
Israeli actions and stalked off the stage angrily. 
Recently, another diplomatic episode came into 
surface when the Israeli Deputy Foreign        
Minister Danny Ayalon summoned the Turkish 
Ambassador to Israel Ahmet Oğuz Celikkol to a 
meeting in order to protest a Turkish soap opera 
that depicted Israeli agents kidnapping            
Palestinian children, but the final purpose of the 
meeting was for Ayalon to insult Celikkol by 
seating him on an inferior chair and avoiding 
shaking hands with him. These incidents,       
explicitly exposed in the media, outline the     
degree of the current status of the Turkish-Israeli 
relationship. 
    Given the fact that the two countries were   
mutually considered as partners and regional 
allies, freezing relationships can be translated in 
line with Turkey’s growing regional ambitions 
and aspiration to become the key mediator and 
regional power in the region. On the other hand, 
the deep differences of the two governments 
over a number of important issues, but             
especially over the nuclear program of Iran, also 
play a role in the current diplomatic deadlock. In 
any case, Turkey’s stature and credibility in the 
Arab world has increased; the final key           
assumption dropped from the analysis of the 
Turkish approach of the issue in a period Israel 
is gathering worldwide criticism about its      
politics in the Middle East.  
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Vital Partnership with Russia and the Energy 
Corridors          
    Both in political and economic terms, the 
relationship between Turkey and Russia has 
been significantly ameliorated in the last decade. 
From a political perspective, during Vladimir 
Putin’s leadership, Russia and Turkey officially 
abandoned the residues of the Cold War era 
through a series of joint declarations towards the 
deepening of their partnership in the fields of 
energy, trade and security. The understanding of 
common interests underlying this relationship is 
evident in reference with the increase in         
high-level political contacts, the wide-reaching 
trade partnership, and the perception of mutual 
trust in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the 
Caspian Sea regions.  
 
    As a matter of fact, Russia is Turkey’s largest 
trade partner, supplier of natural gas, and major 
investor in the construction industry. In addition 
to that, Russian investments in Turkey in the 
fields of tourism and communication have also 
grown considerably in recent years, giving 
Turkey a comparative asset due to its large 
internal market and natural beauty. Similarly, 
Turkey is expanding its ties with Russia via the 
support of Russia’s interest in the conflict zones 
of Caucasus and the mutual acceptance of a 
more elastic and wise rapprochement with 
regards to Iran’s nuclear program. Contrary to 
the US approach to Iran, Turkey has decided to 
develop a non-myopic and less phobic approach 
to the eventual threats that Iran can possess that 
can alter regional stability by denying to accept 
sanctions and marginalizing policies that could 
put further stakes in the regional balance of 
power. Moreover, the US effort to be involved in 
the electoral processes in Central Asia, as part of 
the Washington strategic dogma aiming at 
augmenting its military and political leverage in 
the region, has been accepted with skepticism by 
both Turkey and Russia. In short, we can further 
point out that one of the most important factors 
that keep Turkey and Russia in the same set of 
interests can also be found in the endeavor to 
keep US outside the geographical axis that 
connects Middle East, Central Asia, and the 
resourceful Caspian Sea region. The sayings of 
Brzezinski after the end of the Cold War, that the 
power which would achieve to control the wider 
Eurasia could play a dominant role in regional 
and global politics, seems to find its modern 
version with the vigorous strategic involvement 
of Turkey and Russia in an area where the US is 
struggling to retain a dominant role.  
 
    In equal terms, Turkey is delicately building 
its geopolitical leverage unilaterally by 
constructing and designing pipelines that could 
create energy sufficiency and security of supply. 
Already, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (TBC) pipeline 
has been one of the largest-scale and hefty 
economic achievements of the country, as it 
additionally decreases the oil tanker traffic in the 
Bosphorus, thus contributing to greater stability 
and security in the Istanbul area.  What is more, 
the projected Nabucco gas pipeline linking Erzu-
rum with Europe is considered as a bottom-line 
and crucial strategic initiative with the intention 
to diversify the current energy supply game, led 
mainly by Russia, and crown Turkey as a 
forcefully vibrant actor in energy security of 
supply and efficiency in the wider 
Mediterranean Basin.  
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    All things considered, the East-West energy    
corridor is expected to encourage market      
economy, increase the business opportunities for 
Turkish companies, and strengthen the South 
European gas ring. 
    Notwithstanding, Turkey is wisely keeping 
the door open for cooperation with Russia. The 
visit of Putin in Ankara in August 2009 gave a 
boost to the South Stream pipeline    project, 
which Russia has promoted as an alternative to 
Nabucco. In that sense, Turkey is developing a 
multi-dimensional energy strategy, aspiring to 
seal either of its projects and feel secure and    
independent from any further misbalance of 
power. Meanwhile, Ankara is fostering its       
relationship with Turkmenistan, a strong ally of 
Turkey in Central Asia essentially in the basis of 
the common ethnic and religious ties, as a 
counter-balance to China’s grind for the Caspian 
Sea energy resources. Therefore, soft politics   
coordinately play a role in the enhancement of 
Turkey’s active role, and contribute to the     
making of a wider sphere of geopolitical     
prominence.  
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Re-addressing Full Membership in the EU 
    Since 2005, popular opposition to Turkey’s 
membership has increased across Europe, 
particularly due to the size, the level of 
democratization and macroeconomic 
deficiencies, and the sense that the country does 
not really belong to the European culture. 
Increasing popular opposition in Europe has 
also coincided with the growing of Turkey’s ties 
with the Middle East, Caucasus, and Central 
Asia, and accordingly with skeptical approach of 
the Turkish public opinion to membership. 
Under that prism, the French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel are questioning Turkey’s credentials for 
membership while proposing a privileged 
partnership that could be of equal benefit for 
both EU and Turkey.  
 
    Despite the hindrances and the stalemate, EU 
membership is still considered as a strategically 
essential target for Turkey. Membership should 
not impede Turkey’s geostrategic position but 
instead it could work as a parallel asset for 
voicing out the country’s role and positions. 
Furthermore, bridging the East and West flanks 
of the Mediterranean should be of mutual 
interest for both parts with reference to the 
creation of a common area of action and the 
procrastination of US influence in Eastern 
Europe. Likewise, the defense and security 
doctrine established in the framework of NATO 
could take different dimensions and unleash a 
new strategic coordination between EU and 
Turkey. 
GLOBAL POLITICAL TRENDS CENTER 
 Istanbul Kultur University 
Atakoy Campus,Bakirkoy, 34156 Istanbul-TURKEY 
T: +90 212 498 44 76 | F: +90 212 498 44 05 
www.gpotcenter.org 
 
    As a matter of fact, given that both parts tend 
to decline towards a more deliberate action in 
terms of self-determination within the Alliance, 
a potential initiative aiming at creating a shield 
that would safeguard and address the new 
challenges for regional stability  (e.g. illegal 
immigration; trafficking) could set aside the 
current deadlock and thaw the negotiation 
process.    
 
    In addition to that, the promotion of the idea 
of a privileged partnership in the place of full 
membership should not be abandoned as an 
alternative, given that both parts seem to be 
reluctant of proceeding as vigorously and 
determinedly as in the period of 2002-05 where 
Turkey was obsessed with the accession process 
and evaluation, and the EU was pushing Turkey 
to amend its legislative framework and reform 
its sclerotic military establishment.  
 
    Finally, privileged partnership may offer a 
bilateral independence, and especially in a 
period when the EU is faced with crucial       
socio-economic concerns, Turkey can benefit 
from and re-assert its pivotal role while 
participating in the stimulation of the European 
economic landscape.                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Turkey’s prerogative in addressing the           
economic crisis with reference to the European 
Union 
    In a regional level, Turkey is considered as an 
important stakeholder with a great potential in 
capital. Turkish economy has registered superb 
improvement in competitiveness in recent years 
and proven its potential as a magnet for          
international investors, while having                
ostentatiously preserved sustainable levels of 
growth and production. Being a member of the 
G-20, Turkey has increased its exports,         
modernized its tourism infrastructures,           
expanded the potential of its automobile         
industry, and advanced the quality and quantity 
of its commercial shipping industry.  
    To achieve this, Ankara answered the crisis 
that hit the country in 1999 with a quite            
unprecedented manner for an indebted         
economy: despite having found resort at the    
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to 
liquid its economy, the strong and inspiring    
political leadership of Erdoğan has brought 
about a tremendous shift of growth rates by    
denying the measures the IMF delegate body 
proposed for exiting Turkey from the crisis. The 
result is what we experience nowadays; a     
country with political, social, and economic    
confidence which has a direct impact in its    
geopolitical assertiveness.  
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    The member-states of the EU that are currently encountering a huge debt crisis (e.g. Greece) or 
those that can potentially be found in similar position (e.g. Portugal, Spain, Ireland) in the near 
future should turn their attention to the economic miracle of Turkey and learn from it. At the same 
time, Turkey needs to deepen and strengthen its commercial ties and investments in the 
Mediterranean axis of the EU as an act that could unveil its geopolitical leverage and secure regional 
economic and political stability.  
